I construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where a recession is initiated by losses su¤ered by …nancial institutions, and exacerbated by their inability to extend credit to the real economy. The event that triggers the recession is similar to a redistribution shock: a small sector of the economy -borrowers who use their home as collateral -defaults on their loans (that is, they pay back less than contractually agreed). When banks hold little equity in excess of regulatory requirements, their porfolio losses require them to react immediately, either by recapitalizing or by deleveraging. By deleveraging, banks transform the initial redistribution shock into a credit crunch, and amplify and propagate the …nancial shock to the real economy. In my benchmark experiment aimed at replicating key features of the Great Recession, credit losses (that is, a redistribution shock) of about 5 percent of GDP lead to a 3 percent drop in output, whereas they would have little e¤ect on economic activity in a model where banks are just a veil.
Introduction
I construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where leveraged banks amplify the effects on economic activity of given …nancial shocks. The main questions that I want to address are:
(1) To what extent can arbitrary redistributions of wealth disrupt the credit intermediation process that channels funds from savers to borrowers? (2) To what extent can a disruption of the credit intermediation process cause business cycles?
The motivation for these questions comes from the empirical observation that at least two of the last three recessions in the United States (the 1990-91 recession and the 2007-2009 recession) can be ascribed to situations that involved non-repayment on part of some borrowers on the one hand, and loan losses a¤ecting …nancial institutions on the other. Under this interpretation, it is hard to classify the impulse of these recessions as something that can be easily inserted or found in standard equilibrium macreoconomic models. These models either abstract from …nancial frictions or, when they address them, they abstract from …nancial intermediation. Even when …nancial intermediation is modeled, 1 the shock that hits the economy in these models often involves an exogenous decline in the net worth of …nancial intermediaries, thus being very similar to shocks that destroy the economy's capital stock. This paper goes one step further and addresses this gap. My objective is to develop a tractable framework that studies how disruptions to the ‡ow of resources between agents can act as an exogenous impulse to business ‡uctuations. To do so, I construct a simple DSGE model where …nancial intermediaries (banks, for short) amplify and propagate business cycles that are "…nancial"in nature;
that is, they are originated not by changes in technology, but by disruptions in the ‡ow of funds between di¤erent group of agents. When one group of agents pays banks back less than expected, the resulting e¤ect is a loan loss for the bank which causes a reduction in bank capital. As a consequence, the bank can either raise new capital or restrict asset growth by cutting back on lending. If raising capital is di¢ cult, banks reduce lending. To the extent that some sectors of the economy depend on credit, the reduction in bank credit propagates a recession.
The Model
The model features two household types, entrepreneurs, bankers and a representative …rm. A summary of the model setup in in Figure 1 .
Households work, consume and buy houses, and deposit resources into (or borrow from) a bank through one-period loans: to model heterogeneity and household credit within households in a tractable fashion, they are divided into patient savers and impatient borrowers. To …x ideas, I interpret the impatient borrowers as subprime people (subprimers from now on): the idea that I want to explore is that the original shock that hits the system starts from the decision of these agents not to repay their loans. As a whole, the household sector is a net supplier of savings to the rest of the economy. Entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital (which they rent to a representative …rm) and borrow from the bank, subject to a collateral constraint. Bankers intermediate funds between patient savers on the one hand, and entrepreneurs and subprimers on the other. The nature of the banking activity implies that bankers are borrowers when it comes to their relationship with households, and are lenders when it comes to their relationship with the credit-dependent sectors (entrepreneurs and subprimers) of the economy. I design preferences in a way that two frictions coexist and interact in the model's equilbrium: …rst, bankers'are credit constrained in how much they can borrow from the patient savers; second, entrepreneurs and subprimers are credit constrained in how much they can borrow from bankers. My interest is in understanding how these two frictions interact with and reinforce each other.
Finally, the representative …rm converts entrepreneurial capital and household labor into the …nal good using a constant-returns-to-scale technology.
Patient Household Savers. There is a continuum of measure 1 of savers (indexed by H). They choose consumption C, housing H and time spent working N to solve the following intertemporal problem:
where H is the discount factor, subject to the following ‡ow-of-funds constraint: standard …rst-order conditions for consumption/deposits, housing demand, and labor supply.
Subprimers (Impatient Households, Borrowers). Subprimers (measure ; indexed by S) do not save and borrow up to a fraction of the value of their house. They solve:
S (log C S;t + j log H S;t + log (1 N S;t )) subject to the ‡ow-of-funds constraint and the borrowing constraint:
The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing holdings.
Below, I will show that the constraint binds in a neighborhood of the non-stochastic steady state if S is lower than a weighted average of the discount factors of patient households and bankers. The term L S denotes (one-period) loans made to subprimers, paying a gross interest rate R S : Finally the term " t in the budget constraint denotes an exogenous repayment shock: I assume that subprimers can pay back less (more) than agreed on their contractual obligations if " is greater (smaller) than zero; from their point of view, this shock represents a positive shock to wealth, since it allows them to spend more than previously anticipated.
Assuming that the borrowing constraint binds, subprimers consumption will be determined o¤ their budget constraint (since their consumption Euler equation does not hold with equality), and the optimality conditions for housing demand and labor supply can be written as: to default rather than roll their debt over: defaulting would be equivalent to choosing a value for R S;t L S;t 1 lower than previously agreed, which would generate the same e¤ect as a positive shock to
Entrepreneurs. A continuum of unit measure entrepreneurs solve the following problem:
subject to:
Here, L E are loans that banks extend to entrepreneurs (yielding a gross return R E ), K E is capital that entrepreneurs rent to a goods producing …rm at the rate R K , and is the capital depreciation rate.
I assume that entrepreneurs cannot borrow more than a fraction m E < 1 of their hard assets K E :
As for the case of impatient borrowers, this constraint will be binding near the non-stochastic steady state, provided that entrepreneurs are impatient enough. If the borrowing constraint is binding, the entrepreneur's …rst-order condition can be written as:
Bankers. A continuum of unit measure bankers solve the following problem:
where the right-hand side measures the sources of funds for the bank (net of adjustment costs and loan losses): D are household deposits, and R E L E and R S L S are repayments from entrepreneurs and subprimers on previous period loans. The funds can be used by the bank to pay back depositors and to extend new loans, or can be used for banker's consumption. Note that this formulation is analogous to a formulation where bankers maximize a convex function of pro…ts (discounted at rate B ), once
In a frictionless model, one implicitly assumes that deposits can be costlessly converted into loans.
Here instead I assume that the bank is constrained in its ability to issue liabilities by the amount of equity capital (assets less liabilities) in its portfolio. This constraint can be motivated by regulatory concerns or by standard moral hazard problems: for instance, typical regulatory requirements (such as those agreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) posit that banks hold a capital to assets ratio greater than or equal to some predetermined ratio.
de…ne bank capital at the end of the period, a capital requirement constraint can be reinterpreted as a standard borrowing constraint, such as
Above, the left-hand side denotes banks liabilities (1 ) D t ; while the right-hand side denotes which fraction of each of the banks'assets can be used as collateral. 2 Denote with B;t the multiplier on the bank's borrowing constraint (later, I will show the conditions that ensure that the constraint is binding). Let m B;t = B E t C B;t+1 C B;t denote the banker's stochastic discount factor, The bank's optimality conditions for deposits, loans to entrepreneurs and loans to subprimers are respectively:
The interpretation of these …rst-order condition is straightforward. It also illustrates why the di¤erent classes of assets pay di¤erent returns in equilibrium. Consider the ways a bank can increase its consumption by one extra unit today. 2 In the simple case where E = S = < 1, the fraction E L = 1 can be interpreted as the bank's capital-asset ratio, while
denotes the bank's leverage ratio (the ratio of bank's liabilties to its equity).
1. The banker can borrow from household, increasing (1 ) D by one unit today: in doing so, the bank reduces its equity by one unit too, thus tightening its borrowing constraint one-for-one and reducing the utility value of an extra deposit by B . Next period, when the bank pays the deposit back, the cost is given by the stochastic discount factor times the interest rate R H .
2. The banker can consume more today by decreasing loans to, say, entrepreneurs, by one unit. By lending less to the entrepreneurs, the bank tightens its borrowing constraint, (since it reduces its equity, loans minus deposits), thus incurring a utility cost equal to E B;t ; hence the cost is larger the larger E is: intuitively, the more loans are useful as collateral for the bank activity, the larger the utility cost of not making loans.
For the bank to be indi¤erent between collecting deposits (borrowing) and making loans (saving), the returns on all assets must be equalized. Given that R H is determined from the household problem, the banker will be borrowing constrained, and B will be positive, so long as m B;t is su¢ ciently lower than the inverse of R H . In turn, if B is positive, the returns on loans R E and R S will be lower, the lower E and S are. Intuitively, the larger is, the higher is the liquidity value of loans for bank in relaxing its borrowing constraint, and the smaller the compensation required for the bank to be indi¤erent between lending and borrowing. Moreover, loans will pay a return that is (near the steady state) higher than the cost of deposits, since, so long as is lower than one, they are intrinsically less liquid than the deposits.
Firms. The problem of …nal good …rms is standard and purely static. I assume that these …rms operate a standard constant-returns-to-scale technology, so they make no pro…t in equilibrium. They rent capital from entrepreneurs and labor from households to solve:
The …rst-order conditions are standard. The assumption that households' hours are substitutes implies that in equilibrium W H;t = W S;t .
Equilibrium. I normalize the total supply of housing to unity. The market clearing conditions for goods and houses are:
where adj t denotes total adjustment costs. The set of equations summarizing the equilibrium of the model is summarized in Appendix A.
3. Discussion
Steady State Properties of the Model
In the non-stochastic steady state of the model, the interest rate on deposits equals the inverse of the household discount factor. This can be seen immediately from equation 2.3 evaluated at steady state.
That is:
In addition, when evaluated at their non-stochastic steady state, equations 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16
imply that: (1) so long as B < H (bankers are impatient), the bankers will be credit constrained and; (2) so long as E and S are smaller than one, there will be a positive spread between the return on loans and the cost of deposits. The spread will be larger the tighter the capital requirement constraint for the bank. Formally:
I turn now to entrepreneur and subprimers. Given the interest rates on loans R E and R S , a necessary condition for entrepreneur and subprimers to be constrained is that their discount factor is lower than the inverse of the return on loans above. When this condition is satis…ed (that is E R E < 1
and S R S < 1); entrepreneurs and subprimers will be constrained in a neighborhood of the steady state. Alternatively, this condition requires that entrepreneurs'and subprimers'discount factors are lower than a weighted average (geometric mean) of the discount factors of households and banks.
It is also easy to show that both the bankers' credit constraint and the entrepreneurs' credit constraint create a positive wedge between the steady state output in absence of …nancial frictions and the output when …nancial frictions are present. The credit constraint on banks limits the amount of deposits (savings) that banks can transform into loans. Likewise, the credit constraint on entrepreneurs limits the amount of loans that can become physical capital. Both forces work to reduce the amount of savings that can be transformed into capital, thus lowering steady state output. The same forces are also at work for shocks that move the economy away from the steady state, to the extent that these shocks tighten or looser the severity of the borrowing constraints.
Dynamic Properties of the Model
To gain some intution into the workings of the model, it is useful to consider how time-variation in the tightness of the bankers'borrowing constraint can a¤ect equilibrium dynamics. To do so, it is useful to focus both on the price and the quantity side of the story.
I begin with the price side. For the sake of argument, consider a perfect foresight version of the model, so that variables are equal to their expected values. In this case, in the limiting case of no adjustment costs, the expression for the spread between the return on loans and the cost of deposits can be written as:
According to this expression, the spread between the return on entrepreneurial loans and the cost of deposits gets larger whenever the banker's borrowing constraint gets tigher (an analogous expression holds for the spread between R S;t and R H;t ). Intuitively, when the capital constraint gets tighter (for instance because bank net worth is lower), the bank requires a larger compensation on its loans in order to be indi¤erent between making loans and issuing deposits. This occurs because loans are intrinsically more illiquid than deposits: when the constraint is binding, a reduction in deposits of 1 dollar requires cutting back on loans by
dollars. All else equal, a rise in the spread will act as a drag on economic activity during periods of lower bank net worth. Now I move to the quantity side: whenever a shock causes a reduction in bank capital, the logic of the balance sheet requires for the bank to contract its asset side by a multiple of its capital, in order for the bank to restore its leverage ratio. The bank could avoid this by raising new capital (reducing bankers' consumption), but the bankers' impatience motive and the weak economy make this route impractical or, at best, insu¢ cient. As a consequence, the bank reduceThs its lending. If a substantial part of the economy depends on bank credit to run its activities, the contraction in bank credit causes in turn a decrease in economic activity.
The obvious test of the model is: can bank losses of the magnitude occurred in the last couple of years justify a sharp, large and protracted drop in economic activity? Before I assess the quantitative signi…cance of this mechanism, I need to calibrate the model.
The Model without Banks
As a reference point, it is useful to illustrate the key di¤erences between the model above and a model without banks, or, alternatively, a model where banks are a pure veil and frictionlessy intermediate funds between borrowers and savers. In such a model, all savings are converted into loans, so that equation 2.13 is replaced by a simple de…nition
Moreover, bankers disappear from the model, so that C B;t = 0 and B;t = 0. In addition, the relevant discount factor to price loans is the patient household's stochastic discount factor m H;t = H E t C H;t+1 C H;t .
Calibration
There are thirteen parameters a¤ecting the steady state for which I need to assign values, and …ve additional parameters control the size of the quadratic adjustment costs.
I begin with standard preference and technology parameters. The patient household discount factor is set at H = 0:99: The entrepreneurial discount factor is 0:925: The subprimers discount factors is set at 0:9. I set the capital share = 1=3 and its depreciation rate = 0:025: The weight on housing in utility is set at j = 0:125: These parameters imply a steady state 4 percent return annualized on deposits, a capital-output ratio of 1:7 (annualized), a housing wealth to output ratio of 1:7 (annualized), and an investment to output ratio of 17 percent. The weight on leisure in the utility function of both households, , is set at 2: This number implies a Frisch labor supply elasticity around 3; in the range of macro estimates.
For the parameters controlling leverage, I choose m E = 0:9; m S = 0:9; S = 0:9 and E = 0:9: I also set the share of impatient households/subprimers to = 0:3. One possibility is that a …nancial shock is something that a¤ects the ability of a bank to transform savings into loans. However, this shock is very similar to an investment-biased technology shock, and almost assumes the conclusions: moreover, we already know that this shock (see the discussion in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti, 2010) has a somewhat hard time (in absence of bells and whistles) in generating the joint comovement of consumption, investment and hours that is the essence of business cycles. Another possibility is that the …nancial shock captures an exogenous disturbance to the wedge between the cost of funds paid by borrowers and the return on funds received by lenders (see Hall, 2010 , for such an interpretation): however, it is hard to give a general equilibrium interpretation of this shock, and one would like to believe that changes in spreads are the e¤ect, not the cause, of …nancial shocks.
For my purposes, I want to give to the …nancial shock a di¤erent interpretation that starts by directly feeding into the model the losses that the shock causes. I want to think of this shock as purely redistributive in nature: for some unmodeled reason, the shock starts with one group of agents paying back less than initially agreed on their obligations. I assume these agents are the subprimers. Hence the shock I consider has a double nature: from the lender's (bank) point of view, it is equivalent to an exogenous destruction of the lender's assets (a negative wealth shock); however, from the borrowers' point of view, it is equivalent to a positive shock to wealth. Now, it is obvious that the …nancial shock was not exogenous: one could argue that the real trigger of the crisis was the decline in housing prices that led to defaults that led to non-repayments, but …rst-hand evidence suggests that the big fallout from the decline in housing prices did not occur until banks were forced by loan losses to take dramatic measures to reduce the size of their balance sheets. How does the …nancial shock work? Figure 2 plots the impulse responses, comparing the model with banks with the reference model without banks. 5 The negative repayment shock impairs the bank's balance sheet, by reducing the value of the banks'assets (in the model, it is total loans minus loan losses) relative to the liabilities (in the model, these are household deposits): at that point, the banker can restore its capital-asset ratio either by deleveraging (reducing its borrowing from households), or by reducing consumption in order to restore its equity cushion. In the baseline scenario, both forces kick in, and the bank simultaneously reduces both loans and deposits, thus propagating the credit crunch. In particular, the decline in all types of loans to the credit-dependent sectors of the economy (entrepreneurs and subprimers) acts a drag on both consumption and investment.
By contrary, in a model where banks are not forced to restore their capital-asset ratio, the losses are much smaller. The …nancial shock works like a pure redistribution shock that transfers wealth 3 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf, Table 1 .3. 4 I compute private GDP using subtracting Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment from total Gross Domestic Product. This gives me a …gure of 11,325 billions of dollars for year 2009. 5 The …nancial shock I consider has the nice property of being a pure wash, in absence of any …nancial frictions.
from agents from agents with a low marginal propensity to consume (the households who deposit their savings into the bank) to agents with a high marginal propensity to consume (the subprimers). The main e¤ect of this shock works through labor supply. Subprimers work less (because their wealth is higher), savers work more (because their wealth is lower). Because subprimers have higher wealth, they can increase their borrowing and housing demand, thus crowding out some of the household savings away from the entrepreneurial sector. In the aggregate, the e¤ects on economic activity are negative but very small, almost one order of magnitude smaller than those in the model with credit-constrained banks. 
Some Robustness Analysis

Concluding Remarks
[ TBA ]
I summarize here the equations describing the equilibrium of the model. The shock is a (persistent) repayment shock that leads to credit losses (cumloss) for banks of 4% of GDP after one year (10% after four years). Variables are expressed in percent change from steady state; and losses over GDP, interest rates and spreads, in quarterly basis points.
N ote: Each model period is a quarter. The y-axis measures percent deviation from the steady state. 
